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First, Respondent refers to a "Vital Information Statement" that they refer to as a 
"business record" of the Association. They argue the unrecorded, unsigned "Vital Information 
Statement" applies to both Phase I and Phase II and was signed by each buyer in Phase I and II. 
Respondent's Brief, pp.1-2. 
There is scant evidence to suggest that the document is admissible as a "business record" 
There is no evidence in the record of the Vital Information Statement ever having been signed, 
nor being recorded. Likewise, the document content, if admissible, has no bearing on the legal 
issues before the court. Furthermore, the document references Phase I and was not recorded 
against the properties in Phase I or Phase II, thereby having little to no relevance. R. Vol. I, 
pp.165-170. 
Second, the Appellants in this matter are all of the owners of the Phase II properties. The 
Phase I ownership consists of eleven ( 11) parcels, all of whom voted in favor of the illegal 
assessment to pave the roadway through Phase I. Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Teresa Zirwes 
filed February 24, 2014, Ex. 6 and Ex. 8, p.3, Recital 12. 
Furthermore, the owners in Phase I voted to disproportionately levy the paving 
assessment ( 41 % thereof) upon the Appellants and their four ( 4) parcels in Phase II based on 
distance from Baldy Road. This vote was also done while not allowing the owners of Phase II 
(Appellants) to vote until the Appellants paid prior years' assessments. The Appellants contend 
the prior years' assessments were illegal, exceeding Association authority to increase annual 
assessments. R. Vol. II, pp.369-379. 
II 31, 
Aside the handwritten references that appear to be 
unrelated to the document itself, the amendment, signed by the Appellants T.T. LLC and Farner, 
simply restricts further subdivision of the Phase II parcels. amendment contains no approval 
or signature by Phase I Association or membership, a further reflection of the Association's 
limited powers as pertains to Phase II. 
Fourth, Respondent's Brief suggests the Statement of the Case in Respondent's Brief 
suggests that the parties stipulated to facts by filing Cross-Summary Judgment Motions. This is 
not supported by the transcript. 
At the July 9, 2014 summary judgment hearings, the follo,ving colloquy occurred: 
COURT: 
MR. REED: 
.... And I also wonder are you - are we in 
agreement that since we've got cross 
motions for summary judgment that 
basically that the Court's going to decide 
this as a matter of law? So thoughts on that 
as well. I mean, since you're -- you're --
each asking me to grant summary judgment, 
I don't know if-- we may be saying there 
aren't really any disputed facts. 
I think, Your Honor, that is entirely correct. 
The basic facts are not in dispute in our 
motion. In our brief, we responded to, 
except what Attorney Featherston had said 
in his brief, was that this was a cross motion 
for summary judgment and all the facts are 
in dispute. 
Now, what might be the facts might be in 
dispute but there's no - there's no question 
in mind that this is something that is a pure 
document kind of situation with no need for 
witnesses or trial or anything like that. 
pp. 
At no time did Appellants stipulate to facts in response to the Court's inquiry. Instead, 
both Counsel argued the disputed matter of whether or not the Phase II CC&Rs provide the 
Association authority to assess and lien Appellant's property. 
The Trial Court was required to evaluate each party's motion on its own merit. 
Taylor & Sons, Inc. v. Summerwind Partners, LLC, 157 Idaho 600, 605, 338 P.3d 1204, 1209 
(2014). 
Respondent's Brief asserts that "the underlying basis for each of the [defendant's] 
counterclaims and third party claims was that POVE HOA did not have the authority to assess and 
enforce liens against the Defendants' respective properties for the purpose of road paving." 
Respondent's Brief, p.6. This is partially correct, but in fact, the Answer and Counterclaim filed by 
the Defendants sought relief beyond that pointing out that: 1) the liens, as filed, were defective as 
they did not accurately reflect the Association's corporate entity; 2) that the notices of claim ofliens 
was a slander of title as filed ofrecord prior to the filing of the litigation; 3) Appellants sought 
declaratory judgment and quiet title determining the nature, scope and extent of the Association's 
power and authority to assess liens the future and in regard to past assessments or liens including 
those wl:1ich were at issue in the Plaintiff's Complaint; and, 4) Appellants sought preliminary and 
permanent injunction directing the Association to cease and desist further or future activity contrary 
to Association authority. R. Vol.II, pp.369-378. 
Lastly, the Respondent's Statement of Facts appears to misconstrue what is before the Court 
on appeal. Procedurally speaking, the Plaintiff and Defendants' Cross-Motions Summary 
3 
uoi:nnem: were a 1\/l,>mn,-r,:,n,h 
to Reconsider, or Amend Memorandum Decision was 
Defendants/ Appellants on August 6, 2014. Although the time period for filing a Notice of Appeal 
was arguably stayed by the Motion, the Appellants, nonetheless, timely filed their Notice of Appeal, 
September 2, 2014, from the Court's Memorandum Decision. R. Vol.II, pp.380-385. Court 
then heard the Appellants' Motion to Reconsider, Alter or Amend and issued its Memorandum 
Decision and Order on January 20, 2015. R. Vol.ill, pp.512-525. Appellants filed their Second 
Amended Notice of Appeal on January 27, 2015, timely appealing the Court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order and Amended Judgment both issued January 20, 2015. R. Vol.Ill, pp.530-538. 
As a result of the timely Notice of Appeal and Amended Second Notice of Appeal, the 
Respondent's assertion is incon-ect that it does not appear that Appellants have appealed the Court's 
Memorandum Decision or the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration. Respondent's Brief, pp. 7-
8. 
"do not appear to the 
preliminary statement of issues contained in their multiple Notices of Appeal". Respondent's Brief, 
p.7 
Idaho Appellate Rule l 7(f) provides that a Notice of Appeal should contain a "preliminary 
statement of the issues on appeal" but further states that "any such list of issues on appeal shall not 
prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal." I.A.R. 17(£)(2015) 
The issues presented on appeal in Appellants' opening Brief fairly reflect the issues raised 
before the Trial Court in the July 14, 2014 Motion(s) for Summary Judgment, and, again in the 
December, 2014 Motions to Reconsider. The issues are all timely before this Court on appeal as 
reflected in the Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of Appeal. There should be no confusion as 
to the issues. To suggest otherwise is simply to obfuscate the issues before the Court. 
5 
of 
On this issue, the Respondent's Statement of the Standard of Review is generally 
accurate, as this is an appeal from decisions on motions for summary judgment. As quoted 
above, the Court is required to evaluate each party's motion summary judgment on its own 
merit. Appellants respectfully suggest that the District Court failed to do so in this instance and 
thereby overlooked the variety of the issues raised by Appellants' Answer to Amended 
Complaint, Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint or in their Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Reconsider, Alter or Amend. 
B. The Association's authority is limited as a matter of law by its operative 
documents, and in the case of Phase II owners, Phase II CC&Rs. 
Section B of the Respondent's Brief appears to intentionally sidestep the issues presented by 
Appellants' on appeal. The Association restates provisions ofidaho Code § 45-810 in an effort to 
bootstrap its authority beyond that which is provided in the corporate charter or operative 
documents (Articles and By-laws) and Phase II CC&Rs. 
There are in this instance two (2) separate issues that must be considered: 
First, what is the extent of the Association's corporate power as set forth in its corporate 
documents? And, second, what is the Association's powers for assessment in regard to the Phase II 
property owners (Appellants in this matter) as set forth in 
allowed under Idaho Code§ 45-810? 
recorded Phase II CC&Rs and as 
1. The Corporation's Powers under the corporate documents. 
While a corporation is granted authority to accomplish its lawful 
purposes, a corporation's power to act must be construed by 
6 
reference to of 
114 
In a case involving somewhat similar issues concerning a homeowner's association 
powers, the Supreme Court noted as follows: 
In order to resolve these issues, we must construe the bylaws. 
Because corporate documents are equivalent to contracts among 
the members of the association, the normal rules governing the 
interpretation of contracts apply. Tue objective in interpreting 
contracts is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties. 
The intent of the parties should, if possible, be ascertained from 
the language of the document The determination of a contract's 
meaning and legal effect is a question of law when the contract is 
clear and unambiguous. 
Twin Lakes Village Property Association, Inc. v. Crowley, 
124 Idaho 132,135,857 P.2d 611,614 (1993)[emphasis added] 
In this case, the Articles of Incorporation of Pend Oreille View Estates Owners' 
Association, Inc. are attached as Exhibit 4 to the Affidavit of Teresa Zirwes filed February 24, 
2014. Notably, the Articles contain only a legal description of the properties in Phase I, not 
Phase IL For this reason, the Association is, indeed, a "Phase I Association" with limited powers 
over Phase II owners. The Phase II CC&Rs confirm this by referencing the Association as 
"Phase I Owner's Association". Phase II CC&Rs, §2. 
Article IV of the Articles provides that the Association has only the powers and purposes 
that may be "in accordance with the Bylaws duly adopted by the corporation and those certain 
Covenants, Conditions and Restricts as from time to time amended, (the Declaration) recorded in 
the office of the Recorder, Bonner County, Idaho as Instrument Nos. 449457 amended by 
7 
Zirwes, 
Article IV concludes by specifying the Association's powers as those that are set forth in 
the Phase I Declaration (CC&Rs) and the Bylaws and also specifying the Association's powers to 
"fix, levy, collect and enforce the assessments and as may set forth in the Declarations 
and Bylaws". Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit ofTeresaZirwes, Exhibit 4, Article IV, p.3. 
As discussed in Appellants' opening brief, the Phase I CC&Rs and Bylaws, consistently, 
and without exception, limit the Association's corporate powers to that of maintenance. 
Phase I CC&Rs reference maintenance only in the following instances: Section 2.04( d) 
[the Association has the right and power to contract for .... the maintenance and repair of the 
private roads .... ]; Section 3.04 said rights of way on private roads maintained for the use and 
benefit of the tract owners .... " Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Counsel in Support of 
Defendants/Crossclaimants/Third Party Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment filed 
June 11, 2014, Exhibit B, P. 3-4. [underline added] 
Likewise, the Bylaws § 3 .02.1 contain only the following references to corporate powers 
regard to the roads. 
l) Subsection c permits Phase II owners to cast votes on 
questions "which relate directly to the common access road 
through Phase I property ... which common access roadway 
the Association has authority and responsibility to 
maintain"; 
1 Instrument No. 449457 are the Phase I CC&Rs. Instrument No. 459222 is an a1nendment to 
the Phase I CC&Rs to exclude a small portion of Section 7 from Phase I that would later be part 
of the Phase II CC&Rs and owned by Appellants Farner. Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Counsel 
in Support ofDefendants/Counterclaimants/Third-Party Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Exhibits "A", "B" and "C". 
8 
Subsection d allows assessments "so long as the 
assessments in question are proposed to be a charge against 
casting . Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit 
Neither the Bylaws nor Articles of Incorporation are recorded instruments which is a 
prerequisite to recordation and enforcement of liens under the Idaho Code § 45-810. 
This circumstance supports the Appellants position that nothing of record provided notice 
or reasonable expectations that the Phase I Association would exercise powers to impose a 
paving assessment upon their properties at the time of purchase in 1995 and 1996. Mr. Farner' s 
Affidavit reflects his expectation and negotiation with the developer to avoid this result. R. Vol. 
II, pp. 364-66. The District Court erred in striking the Affidavit of Mr. Farner as inadmissible 
hearsay. 
This also complies with the concept that such notice by recordation is required as appears 
to be the intent behind Idaho Code §45-810. In any regard, the corporate documents do not 
permit broad authority to impose assessments on Phase II for improvement to the roads in Phase 
L The Respondent Association is provided absolutely no legal authority to buttress its argument 
to the contrary. 
2. Association authority under Idaho Code § 45-810 and Phase CC&Rs. 
Contrary to the Respondent's briefing, there is no issue about whether the Association 
generally meets the statutory "definition of a homeowners' association" as contemplated in Idaho 
Code§ 458-810. Respondent's Brief, p.9. 
The prerequisite for a homeowners' association under Idaho Code§ 45-810 is minimal, but 
significant under the facts of this case. A homeowners' association may be an incorporated or an 
unincorporated entity in which membership is based on owning or possessing an interest in real 
9 
§ 10. 
legislature's Statement of Purpose associated with Idaho Code § 45-810 indicates that 
Idaho lacked specific statutory authority authorizing homeowner associations to enforce 
assessments. The statutory authority was adopted in 2002, but authority is premised on a recorded 
instrument granting power to assess and record liens. 
In this case, the only recorded instrument encumbering the Phase II properties and 
authorizing such lien power are the Phase II CC&Rs. As discussed in the opening brief, the Phase 
II CC&Rs severely curtail the Association power to only matters pertaining directly to maintenance 
of the roadways, while simultaneously granting the right to improve roadways to individual lot 
owners. Phase II CC&Rs §§ 2.03 and 2.04. 
Beyond that, the Respondent's Brief fails to address the lack of Association authority for the 
road paving special assessment or the distinction between maintenance and improvements. 
Respondents also do not address Appellants' challenge to post annual assessments in excess of 
Association authority. Appellants' Brief, pp. 21-25. 
For the reasons set forth in Appellants' opening brief and which are unrebutted by 
Respondent's Brief, the trial court erred in its decision that the Association was appropriately 
empowered under the Articles, Bylaws and recorded Phase II CC&Rs to assess Phase II for the road 
paving improvement. The trial court's erroneous decision must therefore reverse and remand with 
instruction to enter Summary Judgment in favor of Appellants. 
10 
Beginning at page 12 of the Respondent's Brief, the Association argues that there is no 
distinction between paving and improvement and that the District Court's ruling in that regard 
should be affirmed. 
Specifically, Respondent quotes the Court Memorandum Decision as follows: 
Nowhere in the CC&Rs or Bylaws is there a distinction made 
between road maintenance and improvement with respect to the 
Association's obligation for road maintenance and the Court 
declines to imply from the use of the word in another context a 
distinction between road maintenance and improvement with 
respect to the Association where none exists anywhere else in the 
CC&Rs. The Court finds the CC&Rs consistently and 
unambiguously set out the obligation of the Association for the 
maintenance of the access roads to and from the county road and 
that the paving of the road was within the scope of this obligation. 
R. Vol.III, p.524; Respondent's Brief, pp.13-14 
This finding is patently false. The Phase II CC&R's do distinguish between improvement 
and maintenance. 
Section 2.04 Limitation on Powers contains a contextual distinction from the preceding 
Section 2.03 Powers of the Association. The District Court failed to address this distinction 
asserting that none existed. In Section 2.04, the Declarant states that the Association has no 
power to maintain roads in Phase II. Further, this section delegates the power to maintain roads 
in Phase II to the owners in Phase II. Section 2.04 states that the limitations do not affect the 
Association's authority to "maintain said access roads on property outside the boundaries" of 
Phase II, which provide access to county roads. Additionally, it specifies that 0\\11ers retain the 
right to "improve" the roads adjacent to their tracts: 
u 
Neither shall this limitation impair ability individual owners 
lots herein described to portion of the road 
property owned by 3.04]. 
not assessments 
against owners Phase II except such assessments as pertain 
directly to the maintenance of roads as referred to in the CC&Rs 
recorded as Instrument No. 449457, records of Bonner County, 
Idaho require said Association to maintain. 
Clerk's Record, Affidavit of Counsel in Support 
of Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third Party Plaintiffs' 
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit D, p.4, Section 2.04 
"[TJhe court will not extend by implication any restriction not clearly expressed in a 
recorded covenant." Pinehaven Planning Board v. Brooks, 138 Idaho 826, 829, 70 P.3d 664,667 
(2003). The District Court erred in this case by extending the definition of maintenance to 
include improvement by paving the road. 
The Respondent's position seems to be that the Court was correct in disregarding the 
Declarai,t' s specific distinction between maintenance and improvement powers and that 
maintenance and improvements are interchangeable terms. But, given the restrictive rules for 
interpretation of covenants, the Court must address the precise language of Section 2.04 of the 
Phase II CC&Rs and the declarant' s use of distinctive terms, duties and rights between 
Association and Owner and between maintenance and improvement. The manner in which the 
Court must interpret the terms of Sections 2.03 and 2.04 is spelled out in Idaho Case law: 
Words or phrases that have established definitions in common use 
or settled legal meanings are not rendered ambiguous merely 
because they are not defined in the document where they are used. 
Rather, a covenant is ambiguous when it is capable of more than 
one reasonable interpretation on a given issue. 
Pinehaven Planning Board, 138 Idaho at 829; 
Quoting City of Chub bock v. City of Pocatello, 
127 Idaho 198,201,899 P.2d 411,414 (1995) 
12 
terms 
as used Phase II are interchangeable, 0.~,.u,F, 
of POVE's obligations, there is simply no distinction betvveen 'maintenance' and 
'improvements"'. Respondent's Brief, p.13. 
In the instant case, neither the CC&Rs nor Bylaws provide specific definitions for the 
terms "improvement" or "maintenance". As noted in Pinehaven, this is not dispositive of the 
issue. Pinehaven requires the Court to determine the legal or common usage definitions of the 
tem1s "maintenance" and "improvement". 
1. Legal Meanings 
When looking for common usage, Black's Law Dictionary defines improvement as "a 
valuable addition made to property or an amelioration in its condition, amounting to more than 
mere repairs or replacement, costing labor or capital, and intended to enhance its value, beauty or 
utility, or to adapt it for new or further purposes." Black's Law, 5th Ed. It further defines 
improvement as "an expenditure to extend the useful life of an asset or to improve its 
performance over that of the original asset" and refers the reader to "contrast with maintenance 
and repair". 
By contrast, Black's defines maintenance of assets to "expenditures undertaken to 
preserve an asset's service potential for its originally-intended life" and defines maintenance as 
the "act of maintaining" or upkeep or preserving the condition of the property to be operated. 
Applying the Pinehaven standard of utilizing common usage of the terminology makes 
clear that Respondent's position that the terms improvement maintenance are interchange-




"In construing a deed, the Court should seek to give effect to the intention of the 
parties. To determine the intent of the parties, the contract or other writing must be viewed as a 
whole and in entirety." Daughertv v. Post Falls Hw:y. DisL 134 Idaho 731, 735, 9 P.3d 534, 
538 (2000). 
The Declarant' s usage of the terms in the Phase II CC&Rs clearly contemplates a 
distinction between the terms as reflected in Sections 2.03 and 2.04 in which the Association's 
powers are limited to maintenance without exception, while adjoining owners are granted 
authority to improve roads. 
Applying Respondent's argument that the terms maintenance and improvement are 
interchangeable, as found in the Phase II CC&Rs, requires the Court to disregard Declarant's 
intent and the language of Sections 2.03 and 2.04 of the Phase II CC&Rs. It is clear the 
Declarant intended to distinguish the two (2) terms. 
"Usage or custom is admissible to ascertain the intention of the parties in reference to 
matters about which the contract is silent." James Cool DDS v. Mountain View Landowners Co-
Op Association. Inc., 139 Idaho 770, 773, 86 P.3d 484,487 (2004). However, extrinsic evidence 
is only necessary if the intent cannot be determined from the context of the Covenant itself. 
"Where a deed is ambiguous, interpretation of the grantor's intent is a question of fact 
determined from the instrument itself, as well as from the surrounding facts and circumstances." 
C&G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 766, 25 P.3d 76, 79 (2001). 
court 
resort to extrinsic case, the Declarant 
consistently referred to maintenance of roads in Phase I as being an obligation of the Association, 
while Section 2.04 grants owners the right to improve the roadway on their parcels. 
This use of the terms improvement and maintenance as separate and distinct activities 
within Sections 2.03 and 2.04 indicate the Declarant's intent that the terms are not 
interchangeable but distinct. 
The District Court erred in its conclusion that the two terms are interchangeable and the 
Respondent's assertion to the contrary is unsupported by the evidence. 
In addition, it is evident from reading Section 2.03 of Phase II CC&Rs that Declarant 
intended to limit Association powers over Phase II owners. 
Respondent's Brief suggests that Appellants have argued the operative documents are 
ambiguous. This is not accurate. Appellants maintain that 2.03 and 2.04 are unambiguous when 
read in its entirety by distinguishing between maintenance and improvement. The Court failed to 
make that distinction, thereby impermissibly increasing the Association powers over Phase II 
ovvners. 
Trial Court stated that it "declines to imply from the use of the word in another 
context a distinction between road maintenance and improvement with respect to the Association 
where none exists anywhere else in the CC&Rs". R. Vol. III, p.524. This ruling is error as a 
matter of law. The Court was required under G&G, Inc., Pinehaven, Cool, and Shawver v. 
Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 93 P.3d 684 (2004), to determine whether the 
Covenants on their face can be interpreted by giving the words or phrases used their ordinary 
15 
usage or a legal definition by their use the Covenants themselves. The 
U'-'\>LU"lvU to 
to enter Summary of Appellants. 
3. Respondent's Legal Authority 
Respondent's Brief argues that "none of the authority cited by the property owners 
supports their contention, while the weight of the authority suggests the opposite", in discussing 
definitions of maintenance versus improvement In truth, the Respondent does not provide any 
applicable Idaho authority to support their contention. 
In response to Appellants' citation to the Idaho Sales and Use Tax Regulations which 
defines a road paving as "improving real property", Respondent argues that this provision says 
nothing about "whether road paving qualifies as maintenance". Respondent's Brief, p.14. While 
Respondent is correct, Respondent misses the point, which is that in the context of Idaho Sales 
and Use Tax Regulations, paving is considered an improvement and a paving contractor is one 
engaging in the act of improving real property. LD.A.P.A. 35.01.02.013 
Similarly, the Respondent is dismissive of the Idaho Supreme Court's analysis of paving 
as an improvement in Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc. v. Summerwin Partners, LLC, 157 Idaho 600,338 
P.3d 1204 (2014). Respondent argues that Hap Taylor turned on the definitions of structure or 
improvement as found in Idaho Code§ 45-501. While true, the distinction does not negate the 
Court's analysis that the act of paving roads results in a constructing a structure and that paving 
constitutes an improvement. The analysis is helpful in this case to determine the intent of the 





Respondent's Brief, p.15. The Phase I Owner's Association argues that maintenance is 
"unavoidably a specie of improvement" and that it is "merely a series of temporary 
improvements". 
To support both assertions, Respondent proffers absolutely no Idaho case law or statutory 
authority. Instead, Idaho case law repeatedly refutes the Respondent's position. See: Byrns v. 
Citv of Moscow, 121 P. 1034, 1036 (1912)[The City's act of paying for improvements such as 
paving appropriate.]; Cole v. City of Lewiston, 295 P. 430 (l 930)[paving is within improvement 
district jurisdiction]; Amsbary v. City of Twin Falls, 200 P. 723 (l 921)[LID for paving is an 
improvement.] Idaho Code§ 45-501 (2015) [person who levels surfaces or otherwise improves 
land or furnishes materials is entitled to lien]; McEwen v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 132 P. 308 
(1913) [city ordinance to grade and pave streets and levy assessments constitutes an 
improvement]. 
The Respondent asserts Floyd v. Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 52 P.3d 863 (2002) 
for the "holding" that improvements include maintenance. There, the court was asked to 
determine whether the road in question had acquired its public highway status under Idaho Code 
§ 40-202 through prescriptive public use and maintenance or improvement at public expense. 
The elements thereof require a showing that the road has been (1) subject to public use for a 
period of five ( 5) years or more and (2) that the "road is worked and kept up at the expense of the 
public". I.C. § 40-202(3). In summarizing the trial testimony fulfilling the second that 
the "road was worked and kept up" at public expense, the Court noted the testimony of 
as 
portions of the road. 
First, it strains credibility to extrapolate a "holding" from Court's recitation of trial 
"worked and kept up at public expense" element of § 40-202, such 
that "maintenance is the same as improvement". "Worked and kept up" as found in the statute 
and as applied in Idaho case law does indeed include both improvements and maintenance, but 
never equates the two terms. The statutory language "worked and kept up" and case law 
construing the statute include instances of both maintenance and improvement at public expense, 
supporting Appellants' position that the terms are distinct. 
Next, the Respondent argues Rich v. Williams, 81 Idaho 311,341 P.2d 432 (1959), and 
an internal quote from the Washington Supreme Court. The Idaho case of Rich addresses 
constitutionality of using highway user revenue (dedicated to highways) for constructing a 
highways department and department of law enforcement administration building. From this the 
Court analyzed neighboring state law on the scope or breadth of the department's authority to 
appropriate and use taxpayer funds. The Idaho Court quotes King Countv v. Merle, 199 Wash. 
685, 93 P.2d 304, 307 (1939) for the holding that in determining scope of state highway use of 
dedicated highway funds under Washington's definition of "maintenance" of public roads. 
The context of Rich v. Williams is dissimilar to the case now before this Court. Further, 
the quote adopted by Respondent is one from the state of Washington and certainly not binding 




case is indeed still good law nearly 150 years later, it most certainly is not good law the state 
of Idaho. 
Lastly, Respondent cites this Court to Utah Code of an improvement project 
for the premise that resurfacing of the road, including paving, constitutes an act of maintenance. 
As discussed above, Idaho case law is well established for the premise that in the context 
local improvement districts or city ordinances, paving a road does, in fact, constitute 
improvement. 
There is no need to scour obscure and antiquated references in Washington, Connecticut 
and Utah when Idaho statutory and case law is well settled on this issue. 
last and final argument proffered by Respondent is that the act of paving must be 
equal to maintenance because Phase I roads were "dusty a11d bumpy" and the "cost to maintain 
the gravel surface had risen to become unreasonable and paving would benefit all properties." 
Respondent's Brief, p.17. 
Respondent's argument seems to be if the parties are "benefitted", as interpreted by one 
of the parties, then the Court may disregard the terms the operative documents, even despite 
the express limitations. Idaho case law and the facts herein do not support the Respondent's 
position. 
The record actually refutes Respondent's position. The Association board members and 
road improvement committee sent out notice of a and "~-u .... ,~ the neighborhood 
that were road" WOUld be an mr,rOVPt11P1'li and 
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road which 20 Vol. I, p.1 
was new 
1 
Following the July 24th meeting from which Appellants were excluded from participation 
a.11d voting, the Association board communicated that road paving improvement had been 
passed and demanded payment from the property owners describing the anticipated road paving 
as a "tremendous improvement to our subdivision". R. Vol. I, p.155. [emphasis added]. The 
Association knew well that the paving assessment was an improvement to the road, not merely 
maintenance within the scope of its authority. 
For the reasons set forth in Appellants' opening Brief and herein, the Trial Court's failure 
to distinguish between improvements and maintenance and failure to enforce the limitations of 
the Phase II CC&Rs restricting the Association to maintenance powers is error and must be 
reversed and remanded with instructions to enter Summary Judgment in of the Appellants. 
D. The Phase I Owner's Association's assessments and liens exceeded their 
authority. 
Respondent asserts that the assessment and liens were properly levied upon Appellants. 
This is incorrect as the recorded covenants limit the Phase I Owner's Association's powers and 
they exceeded their corporate authority. 
1. Covenants limit Association Powers. 
As a matter of Law (LC.§ 45-810), the Association's power to assess Phase II owners is 
limited to that expressed in the recorded Phase II CC&R's. Those powers are limited in scope to 
that "pertaining directly to the maintenance of roads that the CC&R's for Phase I, recorded as 
Instrument No. 449457 ... require the Association to maintain." Other than this limited power, 
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II 
The Phase I CC&R's referenced in Phase II CC&R's §2.03, also only empower the Phase 
I Owner's Association to assess for "maintenance and repair of the private road(s) and/or 
... reconstruction of any portion or portions of the private road(s), damaged or destroyed ... ". 
Phase I CC&R's §2.04(d). 
The Association exceeded its limited authority under both CC&Rs 
2. By-laws entitle Phase II owners to vote. 
As stated in Appellants' opening brief, the by-laws of the Association provide that the 
Phase II Owners "shall be entitled to cast votes on the following matters: 
b. Amendment of these by-laws; 
c. Questions which relate directly to the common access road 
through Phase I property, and across property currently owned by 
the City of Sandpoint, which common access roadway the 
Association has authority and responsibility to maintain; and, 
d. Assessments, so long as the assessments in question are 
proposed to be a charge against the member casting the vote. 
Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Theresa Zirwes 
filed February 24, 2014, 5, pp. 4-5, § 3.02.l 
The Phase I Owner's Association relied upon §4.04 Enforcement of Assessment/Lien, to 
justify the decision not allowing Appellants to vote. However, §3.0 makes clear that Phase II 
owner's rights to vote are unabridged when it concerns bylaws amendments, questions relating to 
the common access road, and assessments which they might be charged. This case involves 
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or vote was extent 
voting. 
The Association could not legally amend its Bylaws so as to impose a paving 
improvement as a special assessment on Phase II ownership. 
The Respondent's assert that District Court acted properly in upholding the Phase I 
Owner's Association's amendment to the Bylaws to permit a "One-Time Paving Assessment". 
The argument seems to be: even if the By-Laws prohibit the Association from assessing for 
anything other than maintenance (Phase I CC&R's §2.04d and Phase II CC&R's §§2.03 and 
2.04); and, prohibit the Association from special assessments that exceed 100% of the prior 
year's annual assessment (By-laws§4.02); it is still permissible to hold a membership meeting 
(excluding Phase II Owner's from voting) to pass an amendment by Phase I owner's unanimous 
vote thereby amending Phase II Owner's legal interests under the Phase II CC&R's. 
Prior Idaho Case Law prohibits this action by the Association. Any amendments to by-
laws which deprive a member of "then-existing rights and privileges" is void as violating the 
members' rights. Twin Lakes Village Property Ass'n. v. Crowley, 124 Idaho 132, 135, 857 P.2nd 
611,614 (1993) The Court in Twin Lakes Village noted that the amendment to bylaws, articles 
of incorporation and protective covenants that eliminated certain recorded protective covenants 
so as to accommodate purchase of a golf course and future development, resulted in a change to 
the voting rights of members such as to fundamentally deprive the members of existing rights 
and privileges as association members. 
Likewise in this case, the Association's argument is that they may amend the by-laws to 
accommodate their one time paving special assessment. But such assessment violated both the 
letter and intent of The Phase II CC&R's thereby violating the "existing rights and privileges" of 
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owners who bought with understanding that authority the 
constructive or actual Phase II and special 
assessment for road improvement deprives the Phase II O\\ners of the "existing rights and 
privileges" found in the Phase II CC&R' s that which only required them to pay for maintenance 
of the roads, not improvements. 
Further, the Phase I Owner's Association has denied Phase II o\vners the "then-existing 
rights and privileges" under the By-laws, by taking away their right to be protected from 
increases in road dues exceeding the 100% of annual assessments. 
Perhaps most importantly, the amendment violates the Phase II Owner's right (as 
minority voters in the Phase I Owner's Association) to cast a meaningfully vote whether to be 
assessed or not, on this "one-time" special assessment and all future assessments. 
The result of the amendment is to impose (disproportionately) the cost of this 
improvement onto the Appellants, a vote that Appellants could not successfully resist in face of 
eleven (11) Phase I member votes. The Phase I Owners, as owners of smaller residential parcels, 
also disproportionately benefitted from the paving adjacent to their parcels. While, the Phase II 
members, as owners of larger unimproved, recreational parcels did not so benefit, but bore the 
brunt of the costs (total Phase II paving assessment $80,044.68 of $214,000.00 paving 
cost). R. Vol. I, P. 158 
The result of Respondent's by-laws amendment altered the Phase II CC&R's by 
permitting the Association to exceed the limitations of §§2.03 and 2.04, while rendering 
Appellants unable to resist the amendment in the voting process or 
as originally written and recorded. 
the Phase II CC&R's 
II 
must matter remanded 
Appellants. 
Attorney's Fees 
1. District Court incorrectly awarded fees. 
The District Court found the Phase I Owner Association to be the prevailing party and 
awarded fees and costs pursuant to the Sections 5.03 of the CC&R's of both Phase I and IL 
However, Sections 5.03 permits award of and costs in an action enforcement of the 
CC&R's to "the Declarant or Tract Owner". Phase I and II CC&R's §§5.03. 
It was error for the Court to award fees and costs based upon the Phase I CC&R' s as they 
have no bearing or encumbering power over the Phase II owners or their properties. It was also 
error for the District Court to award fees and costs to the Respondent Association under the 
Phase II CC&R's as the Association is neither a "Tract Owner" nor the "Declarant" as the terms 
are used or defined in the covenants. Covenants are not to be extended by the Courts to include 
"by implication any restriction not clearly expressed." Pinehaven Planning Board v. Brooks, 138 
Idaho 826, 829, 70 P.3d 664, 667 (2003). 
"Attorney fees may be awarded if authorized by statute or contract." Sherman Storage. 
LLC v. Global Signal Acquisitions II, LLC, 360 P.3d 340,348 (2015); quoting: Stibal v. Fano, 
157 Idaho 428,435,337 P.3d 587,594 (2014). 
Since the covenants do not authorize award of fees to an '"Association", only to "Tract 
Owners" (Appellants) or "Declarant" (Yellowstone Basin Properties, Inc.), it was error for 
the Court to award fees to the Association on those grounds. Phase II CC&R's, 1, ,r L 
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the as a Section 
an assessment 
for entorcement to costs 
reasonable attorney's fees, so long as the Association is prevailing party in such action." 
However, as the Association was acting outside of its authority the by-laws and recorded 
Phase II CC&R' s, it cannot be a prevailing party and this Court must reverse and remand with 
instructions to the trial Court to award Appellants their attorney's and costs at the trial level. 
2. Appellants, not Respondents, are entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. 
a. Respondent's claim for fees and costs on appeal is insufficient. 
Respondent simply state, vvithout analysis, that they are entitled to award of attorney's 
fees and costs on appeal under Idaho Code §12-121, I.R.C.P 54 (e)(l) and I.AR 41. 
Respondent's Brief, P. 21. This is insufficient to entitle Respondent's to fees and costs on 
appeal. 
"We have repeatedly held that we will not consider a request attorney fees on appeal 
is not supported by legal authority or argument" "Attorney fees are awardable only where 
they are by statute or contract". 240 P.3d 583, 
590, 149 Idaho 737, 744 (2010); quoting: Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364,369, 79 723, 
728 (2003). 
In Capps as in this case, the Bank prevailed on appeal but merely cited the court to LA.R. 
41 to which Court stated: "That rule "sets forth the procedure awarding attorney fees 
appeals before this Court, but does not provide authority to award attorney fees." Capps, 149 
Idaho at 7 44; Swanson v. Kraft, Inc., 116 Idaho 31 322, 775 (1989). 
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A citation to statutes and rules authorizing fees, without more, is 
insufficient. Although MBNA cited to the above statutory fees 
provisions, it submitted no argument in its brief as to why fees 
should be awarded under either LC.§ 12-120(3) or LC.§ 21. 
Thus, we decline to award attorneys fees to MBNA on appeal. 
Capps v. FIA Card Services, N.A., 240 P.3d 583,591, 149 
Idaho 737, 745 (2010); quoting Carroll v. MBNl, America Bank, 
148 Idaho 261,270,200 P.3d 1080, 189 (2009) 
The Respondent failed to support their claim for attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
I.AR. 35(b)(5) requires the Respondent to assert their claim for attorney's fees and the basis for 
such claim in Respondent's brief. Respondent failed to do so, thereby waiving such claim. The 
Respondent's fees and costs may not be awarded on appeal. 
b. Appellants are entitled to fees and costs on appeal. 
Unlike Respondent, Appellants did assert their right to fees and costs on appeal in 
Appellants' openi11g Brief. As tract owners enforcing Phase II CC&R' s, the Appellants are 
entitled to award of fees and costs under Section 5.03. Appellants also asserted Idaho Code §12-
121 as basis for award of fees and costs. 
An award of attorney fees under [I. C.] § 12-121 is not a matter of 
right to the prevailing party." However, this Court "permits the 
award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party if the court 
determines the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation. 
Phillips v. Blazier-Henry, 302 P.3d 349, 356, 
154 Idaho 724, 731 (2013); quoting Michalk v. Michalk, 
148 Idaho 224, 235, 220 P.3d 580, 1 (2009). 
26 
Under Idaho §1 1 Respondent's actions matter were pursued 
voting and violating the express terms I II 
CC&R's and the corporate By-laws. Appellants are entitled to attorney's fees and costs on 
appeal and at the trial level. 
Further, under Section 5.03 of the recorded Phase II CC&R's, Appellants are entitled 
award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal and at the trial level. 
The Court is asked to reverse and remand the District Court's Decision with instructions 
awarding Appellants their fees and costs on appeal and at the trial leveL 
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reasons set 
to reverse the 
as set 1S 
findings set forth the Memorandum ,_,,,.,..,h_,,,vu and to 
remand this matter with instructions to the Trial Court to enter Judgment favor of Appellants 
and to award Appellants fees and costs at the trial level. The Court is further asked to award 
Appellants' attorney's fees and cost on this appeaL 
of March, 2016. 
Attorney for Appellants 
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I hereby certify that on the day of March, 2016, I caused a true correct copy 
of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following man.t1er: 
Peter Erbland, Esq. 
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